India’s Nuclear Arsenal Expands – SIPRI Yearbook 2025.

Latest Update

• According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2025 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), India’s nuclear warhead stockpile increased to 180 in 2024, up from 172 in 2023.
• India continues to develop canisterised missiles and invest in MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) capabilities, enhancing its second-strike potential.

Key Highlights of SIPRI 2025 on South Asia

India’s Strategic Nuclear Developments

1. Canisterised Missiles
   • Enhanced missile systems like Agni-V (canisterised, road-mobile) allow for quick launch and better survivability.
   • Reduces pre-launch vulnerability, boosts credible deterrence.
2. MIRV Technology Development
   • Ongoing work on Agni-V MIRV variant: can deploy multiple warheads on a single missile to hit different targets.
   • Increases second-strike capacity, complicates adversary missile defence systems.
3. Nuclear Triad Capability
   • India has completed its nuclear triad with land-based missiles, aircraft, and SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines) like INS Arihant.
   • Enhances strategic depth and ensures credible minimum deterrence.

GS Paper Linkages

Geopolitical Implications

• India–Pakistan Deterrence Dynamics: India’s improvements may prompt Pakistan’s response with more tactical nuclear weapons or mobile launchers.
• India–China Competition: China’s rapid buildup (500 warheads) shifts strategic calculus; India may pursue parity in delivery systems, not numbers.
• Global Arms Control Pressure: India is not a signatory to the NPT, but SIPRI’s findings may trigger debate on transparency, restraint, and confidence-building.

Practice Mains Question

“Critically examine the evolution of India’s nuclear doctrine in light of recent strategic developments and SIPRI’s findings.” (15 marks)

Challenges & Policy Concerns

Way Forward

• Clarify and reaffirm India’s doctrine of No First Use with flexible counter-response.
• Strengthen command and control mechanisms, including Strategic Forces Command (SFC).
• Continue indigenisation of nuclear delivery systems to reduce dependence.
• Actively participate in Track-II diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction dialogues in Asia.